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Abstract
The impact of the US 1933/34 Acts, the rst national nancial regulation acts in
the world, on nancial markets have been under debates since Stigler (1964). Major
ndings in the literature is that nancial regulation enacted by these laws is at best
being ine¤ective to improve nancial markets until some recent studies imply indirectly
that they could be e¤ective. By studying daily returns of NYSE data from 1890 to
1970, this paper provides systematic evidence that the 1933/34 Acts have substantially
reduced market volatilities after controlling for Great Depression e¤ect and macroeco-
nomic variables. Moreover, we show that even when we treat the existence and the date
of the volatility changes as unknown, statistically identied structural changes are fully
consistent with the above results that the volatility reduction time coincide with the
enacting of the Acts.
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whether SEC enforced disclosure rules actually improve the quality of informa-
tion . . . remains a subject of debate among research almost 70 years after the SECs
creation.
Economic Report of the President of the U.S.A., 2003
1 Introduction
The US Securities Act of 1933 and the Federal Securities Exchange Act of 1934 are the most
important laws on nancial regulation. In addition to the fact that they are the rst national
laws on nancial regulation in the world, the later also created the SEC (Securities and Exchange
Commission), the rst state nancial market regulator in the world. The regulatory response,
Sarbanes-Oxley Law (2002), to recent corporate scandals (e.g. Enron and Worldcom etc.) has been
to focus once again on the same principle of the two Acts, i.e. mandatory disclosure. Moreover,
all other countriesnancial regulators in the world take the two Acts and the SEC as a model.
However, the debate on the impact of nancial regulation in general, the role of the 1933/34 Acts
in particular, still remains unsettled.
Before 1933, there were no legal requirements on information disclosure in nancial markets.
Disclosure of nancial results was voluntary. Firms could customize their balance sheet and income
statement disclosure; elect whether or not to have statements audited. In fact, about half of all rms
traded in the NYSE disclosed sales and cost of goods, and about 90% of rms disclosed depreciation,
current assets and current liabilities (Benston, 1973). The NYSE enforced self regulation since the
late 1920s that all newly-listing rms should provide an audited balance sheet, income statement.
However, currently trading rms were exempted (Mahoney, 1997). After rapid expansions of the
markets in the 1920s, there was an unprecedented market crash in 1929. Evidence provided in
Congressional hearings in the aftermath of the 1929 crash convinced the lawmakers that the cause
of the crash was large scale nancial frauds. State o¢ cials estimated that nancial frauds caused
about US$ 25 bln losses to the investors (Seligman, 1983). As direct reactions to the unprecedented
nancial frauds and the market crash, the Securities Act was passed and became e¤ective on May
27, 1933. It required all new issues sold to the public on or after July 27, 1933 to le a disclosure
document. Then the Securities Exchange Act was passed and enacted in June 1934, which requires
all public companies to fully disclose nancial information. The SEC, created by this Act, is the
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administering agency for both Acts.
According to the lawmakers nancial market regulation codied by the two Acts is necessary
since without a state regulation during 1929 the prices of ... stocks on the New York Stock
Exchange were subject to manipulation ... Thus, no one could be sure that market prices for
securities bore any reasonable relation to intrinsic values ...(SEC, 1959). However, how to evaluate
the impacts of the Acts has been under debates.
In a pioneering work Stigler (1964) studies stock returns before and after the implementation
of the Acts. Stigler compares how well investors fared before and after the SEC was given power
to enforce mandatory disclosure for new issues. He examines the ve-year price history of all new
industrial stocks introduced in the 1923-1928 period and of all new industrial stocks introduced
in the 1949-1955 period. To eliminate the e¤ects of general market conditions, Stigler measures
stock prices relative to market averages. He nds that there was no signicant di¤erence before and
after the introduction of the SEC. In both periods the stock of newly issued shares declined sub-
stantially in the years following the IPO relative to the average market price. Thus, he concludes
that the SECs mandatory new issue disclosure requirements had no material e¤ect. Similarly,
Benston (1973) investigates whether rmsstock prices improved when they were required to dis-
close nancial data. Benston compares the annual stock price returns of disclosers, which are rms
that voluntarily disclosed data with the returns of non-disclosers, which are rms that disclosed
only when required by the new law. He nds that non-disclosers did not perform better with the
enactment of the Act. Thus, he concludes that the disclosure requirements of the Securities Ex-
change Act of 1934 had no measurable positive e¤ect on the securities traded on the NYSE. There
appears to have been little basis for the legislation and no evidence that it was needed or desirable.
Certainly there is doubt that more required disclosure is warranted.Similarly, Jarrell (1981) and
Simon (1989) also report that mean returns were not changed by regulation.
O¢ cer (1973) examines the impacts of the 1933/34 Acts on stock market volatility. He con-
structs a time series on stock market volatility going back to the 1890s by using the rolling 12-month
standard deviation of stock market returns. He reports a return to normal levels of variability
after the abnormally high levels of the 1930sand asserts that there was no any signicant impact
of the Acts. However, There are serious methodological drawbacks in O¢ cer (1973). First, the
rolling 12-month standard deviation is a poor measure for stock market volatility. Second, the
e¤ect of the Acts on stock market volatility was not directly tested. The assertion was based on
3
a study on the relationship between stock market volatility and macroeconomic variables but no
joint test was conducted on the e¤ect of both regulation and macroeconomic variables on stock
market volatility.
Recently, Daines and Jones (2005) test whether bid-ask spreads fall in short run after the passage
of the 1934 Exchange Act. Bid-ask spreads are used as a proxy for information asymmetries because
they reect the risk that market makers will lose money when trading against informed parties.
Little evidence is found that changes in bid-ask spreads are associated with mandatory disclosure
law. Using similar approaches, Mahoney and Mei (2005) study the impact of the Acts on bid-ask
spreads over a further shorter period 1935-1937. They also nd no evidence that the new disclosures
required by the securities laws reduced bid-ask spreads.
In contrast to the overwhelming negative results in studying direct impacts of the 1933/34
Acts, some recent literature provides indirect or general evidence suggesting strong positive impacts
of state regulation on short run performance or long run development of nancial markets. By
investigating the e¤ect of The 1964 Securities Acts Amendments, which extended several disclosure
requirements to large rms traded over-the-counter (OTC), Greestone et al. (2005) discover that
the Amendments improved short run returns of the OTC rms. Glaeser et al. (2001) nd that
with more rigorous state regulation Poland had a substantially better nancial development than
that in the Czek Republic. Evidence discovered from cross country studies by La Port et al. (1998,
2006) and Djankov et al (2006) suggest that mandatory information disclosure supports nancial
market development. However, there is still no agreement in the literature on the impact of the
worlds rst state nancial regulation laws on nancial markets.
By using daily return data of the NYSE from 1890 to 1970, this paper provides evidence that
the 1933/34 Acts have substantially reduced stock market volatilities both in short run and in long
run after controlling for Great Depression e¤ect and macroeconomic variables. To our knowledge,
this is the rst direct systematic evidence that shows strong positive impacts of these Acts on
reducing nancial market risks. Most previous studies on direct impacts of the Acts are focused
on short period around the passage of the Acts. In contrast, both short run and long run impacts
of the Acts are investigated in this paper.
How to estimate inherently unobservable stock market volatility has been one of the most
active areas of research in empirical nance and time series econometrics during the past decade.
Increasingly sophisticated statistical models have been proposed to capture the time variation
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in volatility. The approaches for empirically quantifying volatility are generally dived into two
categories, i.e. nonparametric and parametric methods. Realized volatility measurement, one of
nonparametric methods, is a direct ex-post empirical estimation of the volatility without any specic
functional form assumptions. The parametric method includes the ARCH class of models which
are very commonly used methods to model time-varying volatility. In particular, pioneered by
Hamilton and Susmel (1994) and Cai (1994), Markov-switching ARCH models which incorporate
Markov-switching process and ARCH models are used to model structural changes in the time
variations of volatilities and capture the e¤ects of sudden dramatic political and economic events
on the volatilities. To check the robustness of our results, we employ both realized volatility and
Markov-switching ARCH approaches to volatility modelling in this paper.
As a rst step of our investigation, we estimate the monthly volatility of the stock market using
nonparametric methods. We overcome the methodological drawbacks employed in the literature
(e.g. O¢ cer, 1973) by applying realized volatility measure. We use squared daily returns to
construct an ex post measurement for the monthly volatility of stock market returns from January
1890 through December 1970. We then investigate the e¤ects of two Acts on stock market volatility
in both short and long run using multiple regressions. In the regression for short run 1932-1936, we
introduce two dummy variables corresponding to the enforcement dates of the 1933 and 1934 Acts
respectively. We regress stock market volatility on these two dummy variables and other control
variables such as ination, money growth and industrial production. We nd that the mean level
of stock market volatility fell about 32% after July 1933 and reduced further 22% following the
enforcement of the 1934 Act. In long run, we dene two periods, "pre-regulation" period: 1890-
1933, and "post-regulation" period: 1934-1970. To control for Great Depression e¤ect, we also
introduce dummy variable equal to unity during the Great Depression period 1929-1939. The
other control variables are the same as in short run. We nd that the general level of stock market
volatility fell around 15% during post-regulation period 1935 to 1960 even when control for Great
Depression e¤ect and macroeconomic variables. To investigate the robustness of our regression
results, we compare the e¤ects of SEC regulation for di¤erent time spans. Overall, di¤erent sample
periods lead to quantitatively similar regression results. This suggests that the enforcement of 1933
Securities Acts and 1934 Exchange Act is associated with the reduction in the mean level of stock
market volatility in both short and long run.
Although we have statistically signicant regression results, still the impacts of the Acts might
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take place at an unknown point in time, or slowly. Moreover, there are possibilities that results from
regression models with imposed dummy variables may capture things other than the impacts of the
Acts. That is, we should address the following questions to make our evidence more convincing.
Are there other reasons than the Acts that drives the reduction of market volatility? Are the
regulationdummy variables dened articially in favor of the Acts?
To address those questions and further conrm the volatility reduction was indeed caused by
the Acts, we employ Markov-switching ARCH approach by modelling the volaitlity as a stochastic
process whose conditional variance is subject to shifs in regime according to a markov process
governed by a state variable. The probabilities of switching between regimes are time-varying. For
our purpose, the most important aspect of the Markov-switching ARCH model is its ability to
objectively date the states of the economy so that we do not need to distinguish ex-ante between
high and low volatility times. We investigate whether periods of decreased stock market volatility
identied by the Markov-switching ARCH models coincide with the enforcement of the 1933 and
1934 Acts.
Estimation results show that between January 1932 and December 1936, the volatility process is
characterized by three regimes, low, medium and high volatility. The high-volatility state describes
the period from January 1932 through October 1933, with the medium-volatility state characteriz-
ing from November 1933 till October 1934. The low-volatility state dominates 1935 and 1936. The
variance in the medium-volatility state (st = 2) is more than two times that in the low-volatility
state (st = 1), while that in the high-volatility state (st = 3) is more than nine times that in the
low-volatility state. Comparing the dates when the Acts became e¤ective with medium and low-
volatility dominated periods, we nd that medium-volatility state corresponds with the enactment
of Securities Act in May 1933, and low-volatility period with the enactment of Exchange Act in
June 1934. The coincidence between the identied dates of medium and low volatility regimes and
the dates of the enacting SEC regulation further conrms that nancial regulation reduces stock
market volatility.
As a robustness check, we also test for multiple structural breaks in the mean levels of the stock
volatility by adopting the methodology developed by Bai and Perron (1998). Similar to Markov-
switching approach, the number of break points and their location are treated as unknown. The
statistically identied dates of the breaks in the time series of stock market volatility are amazingly
consistent with the commencement of the Acts with a fairly high precision! In short run, the break
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dates are estimated at 10/1933 and 10/1934 with 90% condence interval [08/1933,01/1934] and
[08/1934,12/1934] respectively. Two breakpoints break the time series of stock market volatility
into three regimes: mean volatility fell substantially from regime 1 (01/1932-10/1933) to regime
2 (11/193310/1934), and then fell further during regime 3 (11/1934-12/1936). In long run, the
estimated break date is 08/1934 with 90% condence interval [06/1927,10/1940]. Mean volatility
fell substantially from regime 1 (01/1890-07/1934) to regime 2 (08/193412/1970). In summary,
based on the statistically identied number of volatility regimes and break dates, the results of our
structural break tests are are highly consistent with the results of Markov-switching models.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents regression results on both
short and long run. Section 3 reports the results of Markov Switching ARCH models. Section 4
summarizes the results of further robustness checks. The appendix provides more details. Section
5 concludes.
2 Multiple linear regression analysis
Our goal is to examine the e¤ect of the introduction of SEC regulation on the level of stock market
volatility. It is well known now that stock market volatility varies over time and what drives
volatility has long been the subject of both theoretical and empirical research in macro economics
and in nancial economics. Schwert (1989) nds stock market volatility is related to macroeconomic
variables but these variables only explain a small part of the movements in stock market volatility.
A number of empirical studies (see, e.g., Brandt and Kang, 2004) have further conrmed Schwert
(1989) and nd that stock market volatility in the US is higher in bad times than in good times.
Beltratti and Morana (2004) study the relationship between macroeconomic and stock market
volatility, using S&P500 data for the period 1970-2001. They nd that stock market volatility are
associated in a causal way with macroeconomic volatility shocks, particularly to output growth
volatility. Previous studies also document that there is a positive relationship between volatility
and trading volume. Karpo¤ (1987) o¤ers a comprehensive survey on the relation between volatility
and trading volume. Wang (1994) builds a model which examines the link between the nature of
heterogeneity among investors and the behavior of trading volume and its relation to price dynamics.
His model shows that volume is positively correlated with absolute price changes. Gallant, Rossi,
and Tauchen (1992) also nd a positive correlation between conditional volatility and volume.
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In this paper, in order to disentangle the e¤ect of SEC regulation on stock market volatility, we
control all macroeconomic variables and trading volume that have been studied in the literature for
stock market volatility. Moreover, the formation of SEC regulation was a one-time event coinciding
with many other economic events. Schwert (1989) nds that stock market volatility during Great
Depression period from 1929 to 1939 was unusually high compared with either prior or subsequent
period. This adds extra di¢ culties to separating the e¤ect of SEC regulation on stock market
volatility from other economic events.
2.1 Volatility measurement
The purpose of this paper is to describe historical movements in volatility and examine the im-
pact of nancial regulation on volatility, therefore we follow the approach of French, Schwert and
Stambaugh (1987) and Schwert (1989). We use squared daily returns to construct an ex post mea-
surement for the monthly standard deviation of stock market returns from January 1890 through
December 1970. The estimate of the monthly standard deviation is
t =
(
NtX
i=1
r2it
)1=2
(1)
where rit is the stock market return on day i in month t (after subtracting the sample mean for
the month) and there are Nt trading days in month t.
This realized volatility estimator has several advantages over the rolling 12-month standard de-
viation used by O¢ cer (1973), which attempts to addresses similar questions as this paper. First,
the accuracy of the standard deviation estimate for any month is improved because more return ob-
servations are used. Second, our monthly standard deviation estimates use non-overlapping samples
of returns, whereas adjacent rolling twelve-month estimators used by O¢ cer (1973) induce arti-
cial smoothness. Moreover, realized volatility computed from high-frequency intraperiod returns,
such as that described in equation (1), is an unbiased and e¤ectively error-free measure of return
volatility under certain assumptions (Andersen et al., 2003).
Figure 1 plots the monthly estimates of standard deviation of stock returns over sample period
1885-1970. Summary statistics are reported in Table 1. To provide a intuitive feel on how volatility
changes before and after SEC regulation, we also report summary statistics of monthly estimates
of stock market volatility over di¤erent subsample periods. As we can see from Table 1, while
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comparing the period 1890 to 1933 with 1934 to 1970, not only did the mean level of stock market
volatility reduce 25% but also the volatility of volatility reduced around 30%. The volatilities
exhibit a substantial degree of positive skewness and a very large excess kurtosis.
Macroeconomic data are only available at monthly frequency. To estimate macroeconomic
volatility from monthly data, we estimate a 12th-order autoregression for the returns, including
dummy variables Djt to allow for di¤erent monthly mean returns, using all data available for the
series,
Rt =
12X
j=1
jDjt +
12X
i=1
iRt i + t (2)
We then use absolute value of the residuals as the estimators of volatility. This method is a
generalization of the 12-month rolling standard deviation estimator used by o¢ cer (1973), Fama
(1976), Merton (1980). Summary statistics of macroeconomic variables are reported in Table 1.
2.2 Data sources
The daily stock market return series from January 1926 to December 1970, consists of returns
on the value-weighted portfolio of NYSE stocks, are obtained from the Center for Research in
Security Prices (CRSP). Returns before 1926 are taken from Schwert (1989), who uses a comparable
estimator based on the daily returns of the Dow Jones composite portfolio. From 1890 to 1926,
the Dow Jones returns are the only widely available daily series. From 1890 to 1896, Dow Jones
reported one index that was dominated by railroad stocks. After 1897, they report separate indexes
for transportation and industrial stocks. Schwert combines these indexes to create a composite
index weighting each subindex in proportion to the number of stocks in each portfolio. Schwert
also made an adjustment for daily dividend yields to this daily return series. Therefore, this daily
return series created by Schwert is very close to the CRSP value-weighted portfolio returns. For
more details, please see Schwert (1990).
The ination rates for 1857-1889 are from the Warren and Pearson (1993) index of producer
prices; for the period of 1890-1970 are from the Bureau of Labor StatisticProducer Price Index
(PPI).
Concerning industrial production, for the period of 1889-1918, the data are Babsons Index of
the physical volume of business activity from Moore (1961); for the period of 1919-1970, the data
are the index of industrial production from the Federal Reserve Board.
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Regarding the money supply data, the 1907-1960 data are from Friedman and Schwartz (1963);
whereas the 1961-1970 data are seasonally adjusted monetary base reported by the Federal Reserve
Board.
Finally, trading volume data are from Standard & Poors (1986, p.214) report which provides
monthly NYSE share trading volume for 1883-1985. Citibase (1978) contains similar data for
1986-1987. These data were kindly provided by William Schwert.
2.3 Regressions in short run and long run
So far direct evidence on the impacts of the 1933/34 Acts on nancial market performance in the
literature is insignicant at the best. All the existing studies in the literature focus on short-run
e¤ects of two Acts. However, series recent ndings from cross country studies by La Porta et al.
(1998, 2006) and Djankov et al. (2006) imply that mandatory disclosure improved e¢ ciency of
securities markets in long run. Moreover, the theory of Xu and Pistor (2006) implies that the
enforcement of two Acts and the introduction of SEC regulation should have fundamental impacts
on nancial markets, hence it could have both short run and long-run e¤ects on stock market
volatility. Our empirical work intends to ll in the gap by investigating the e¤ects of two Acts on
stock market volatility in both short and long run.
In short run, corresponding to the dates when the two acts were enacted, the period between
1932 and 1936 is divided into three sub-periods: January 1932 to July 1933 (pre the 1933 Act),
August 1933 to June 1934 (post the 1933 Act, pre the 1934 Act), July 1934 to December 1936
(post the 1934 Act). In order to examine whether the enforcement of the two Acts is associated
with the reduction on the mean level of stock market volatility during these di¤erent periods, our
regression is:
lnst = + 1R1t + 2R2t + 1 ln jptj+ 2 ln j"mtj+ 3 ln jitj+ 4 lnst 1 + ut : (3)
Where we introduce the dummy variable R1t corresponding to the enforcement of 1933 Act, R1t
equals to zero before July, 19334, one otherwise. R2t corresponding to the enforcement of the
1934 Act, equal to zero before June, 1934, one otherwise. Under null hypothesis, the enforcement
of two Acts has no impact on the level of stock market volatility, 1 = 2 = 0: To control for
other factors a¤ecting stock market volatility, we include in the regression the logarithms of the
4After July 1933, all new issued companies were required to fully disclose relevant information.
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predicted standard deviations of PPI ination, of money base growth, and of industrial production.5
V olmt is the growth rate of trading volume from month t-1 to month t6. To address the issue of the
persistence in volatility, we include two lags of the dependent variable in the regression specication
based on Akaikes and Schwarzs Criterion.
In long run, over the period 1890 to 1970, given the impacts of the two Acts are too close
to be identied separately in long run, which is conrmed statistically in our next step of analy-
sis, we divide the long run period into two sub-periods, "pre-regulation" period: 1890-1933, and
"post-regulation" period: 1934-1970. Moreover, it was discovered that stock market volatility was
extraordinarily high during the Great Depression period of 1929-1939 (Schwert, 1989). Suppose
the Great Depression is an exogenous factor to nancial regulation, we control for the e¤ect of the
Great Depression period in our long run regression model. Following Schwert (1989), our multiple
regression is:
lnst = + rDrt + Rt + 1 ln jptj+ 2 ln j"mtj+ 3 ln jitj+ 4 lnst 1 + ut : (4)
where we introduce the dummy variable Rt equal to zero during the pre-regulationperiod (1890-
1933), one for post-regulation period (after 1934). To control for Great Depression e¤ect, we
dene dummy variable Drt equal to one from 1929-1939, zero otherwise. To control for the World
War II e¤ect, we also dene the dummy variable WWII equal to one from 1942 to 1945, zero
otherwise7. Under null hypothesis, SEC regulation does not a¤ect the mean level of stock market
volatility,  = 0. The other control variables are the same as in short run. As a robust test,
impacts of regulation is also estimated without controlling Great Depression e¤ect.
2.4 Results on short run and long run impacts
In the following we report basic regression results that the two Acts signicantly reduced market
volatilities both in short run and in long run.
5Schwert (1989) relates stock market volatility to these macroeconomic variables. He argues that in a simple
discounted present value model of stock prices, if macroeconomic data provide information about the volatility of
future cash ows or future discount rate, they might explain some variations of stock market volatility. Using data
from 1857 to 1987, He nds that these macroeconomic variables explain a small portion of the changes of stock
market volatility.
6Augmented Dicky-Fuller test results reject the null hypothesis that the series of growth rate contains a unit root.
71942 is the year when the US o¢ cially declared war against Japan.
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Table 2 reports results in the short run, over the period of 1932 to 1936. The coe¢ cients
for macroeconomic variables are all insignicant, indicating that they do not explain much of the
time series variation in stock market volatility during 1932 to1936. Our main interest lies in the
coe¢ cients for two regulation dummy variables.  represents the general level of volatility during
the pre-1933 Act period: January 1932 to July 1933; (+1) represents the general level of volatility
during the post-1933 Act period: August 1933 to December 1936; (+1+2) represents the general
level of volatility during the post-1934 Act period: July 1934 to December1936. The coe¢ cient 1
for the 1933 Act dummy is -0.31 and signicant at the 0.05 level, indicating the mean level of stock
market volatility fell about 32% after July 1933. The 1934 Act dummy has a coe¢ cient of -0.28
and is signicant at the 0.05 level, implying that the mean level of stock market volatility reduced
further 22% following the enforcement of the 1934 Act. The adjusted R2 is 0.806. The coe¢ cients
for two dummy variables are negative and signicant while controlling for macroeconomic variables,
suggesting that there were signicant reductions in the level of stock market volatility following the
enforcement of two Acts in short run. Moreover, among all the factors considered only the enacting
of the two Acts explains the trend of market volatility over that period of time.
There might be concerns about impacts of sample period on estimation results. In Table 2,
we also report the regression results for di¤erent sample periods 1932 to 1935, 1933 to 1936, 1933
to 1935. Similar to the results for 1932 to 1936, the e¤ects of the macroeconomic variables are
not signicant for all sample periods. Estimates of 1 , the di¤erential intercept during post-1933
Act period, are between -0.28 and -0.31 across di¤erent sample periods, and all are reliably below
zero, signicant at the 0.05 level. Estimates of 2, the di¤erential intercept for post-1934 Act
period, are between -0.21 and -0.28 across di¤erent sample periods, and all are signicant at the
0.05 level. Overall, di¤erent sample periods lead to quantitatively similar regression results. This
suggests that the enforcement of 1933 Securities Acts and 1934 Exchange Act is associated with
the reduction in the mean level of stock market volatility in a short time of period
Table 3 summarizes the main empirical results for long run. Over the sample period of 1909 to
1970, the estimate of the coe¢ cient for regulation dummy, which captures the 1933 and 1934 Acts,
is  0:07 with a tstatistics of  2:16. This indicates that the nancial regulation enacted by the
two Acts reduced stock market volatility by about 25% for the period of 1934 to 1970 compared
with the pre-regulation period of 1890 to 1933. We obtain the above result by controlling for Great
Depression e¤ect and macroeconomic variables. Consistent with Schwert (1989), the average level
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of stock volatility was substantially higher during Great Depression that the coe¢ cient r for Great
Depression dummy is 0:30 with a t-statistics 6:81. The e¤ect of World War II on stock market
volatility is insignicant. Also consistent with previous literature, the trading volume is signicantly
positive related to stock market volatility.The estimate of industry production coe¢ cient is 0:02
and signicant at the 0:05 level while the estimate of PPI ination coe¢ cient is 0:02 and signicant
at the 0:10 level. That is, except the exogenous Great Depression e¤ect, the biggest factor which
explains the trend of market volatility for this period of time is the regulation enacted by the Acts.
Similar to our study on short run impacts of the Acts, we investigate the robustness of our
long-run results by comparing the e¤ects of SEC regulation for di¤erent time spans (Table 3).
No previous study has analyzed the possible varying e¤ects of SEC regulation over time. We
have two groups of results. Regressions of the rst group contains all macroeconomic variables,
sample periods start from 1909 (since we do not have data for money growth before 1909), end in
di¤erent years. The second group include two macroeconomic variables, Industry production and
PPI ination, and sample periods start from 1890, end in di¤erent years.
For the rst group, the estimates of the macroeconomic volatility coe¢ cients are all positive,
and some are reliably above zero. Our main interest is estimates of Regulationcoe¢ cient  in the
table, the di¤erential intercept during post-regulation period. They are  0:06 with a t-statistics
 1:75 and  0:07 with a t-statistics  2:16 across two di¤erent sample periods.
For the second group, sample periods is expanded to cover two more decades data starting
from 1890. However, money growth variable is dropped in the regressions for lack of data. Similar
to the rst group, across di¤erent sample periods, the estimates of the macroeconomic volatility
coe¢ cients are all positive, and some are reliably above zero. Estimates of  are  0:08 and  0:09
across two di¤erent sample periods. Di¤erent from the results in the rst group, both estimates of
 are reliably below zero and signicant at the 0.05 level. The biggest drop in the mean level of
stock market volatility again appears during post-regulation period 1934-1970.
In summary, regulation e¤ect is strong in both short run and long run that di¤erent sample
periods lead to quantitatively similar regression results. This suggests that nancial regulation,
enacted by the two Acts, is associated with a signicant reduction in the general level of stock
market volatility when controlling for Great Depression e¤ect and other macroeconomic variables.
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2.5 Specication tests
To conrm that our basic results are robust, this section presents additional short run and long
run regression results. In short run, we report more regression results in Table A1 from di¤erent
sample periods. The results are qualitatively similar to those in Table 2. Estimates of 1, the
di¤erential intercept during post-1933 Act period, are between -0.20 and -0.26 across di¤erent
sample periods, and all are reliably below zero, signicant at the 0.05 level. Estimates of 2, the
di¤erential intercept for post-1934 Act period, are between -0.11 and -0.24 across di¤erent sample
periods and they are all statistically signicant. In long run, we drop the money growth variable
and re-estimate the models for periods of 1909-1960, 1909-1970. As in Table 3, all estimates of
 are negative and most of them remain statistically signicant, which indicates the association
between the introduction of SEC regulation and the reduction in the general level of stock market
volatility.
In table A3, we also report regression results without controlling for Great Depression e¤ect.
This corresponds to an alternative hypothesis that the Great Depression is endogenously associated
with how the nancial market is regulated. Again, all estimates of  are negative and statistically
signicant.
3 Markov regime switching approach
The results provided in previous section are based on estimated coe¢ cients of dummy variable(s),
which are dened by dates that the Acts were enacted. Interpreting those as evidence that the
1933/34 Acts reduced market volatility faces some potential challenges. First, market volatility
reduction might be caused by some other reasons instead of by enacting the 1933/34 Acts. That
is, if the structural break of the time series data occurs at a di¤erent date than 1934, the imposed
dummy variable(s) in Regressions (3) and (4) might capture that structural break(s), but economic
interpretations could be di¤erent. Second, the precise timing of the e¤ects of the Acts is not known
since the inuence of SEC regulation might take place slowly. That is, even without a doubt that
the Acts indeed reduced market volatility the estimated regulation e¤ect from Regressions (3) and
(4) might be incorrect if the dummy variables were imposed on wrong dates.
To address these challenges and further test the hypothesis that the the reduction of stock
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market volatility is associated with the introduction of SEC regulation, we employ the Markov
switching ARCH model. The ARCH family of models is a very pouplar method to characterize
the volatility of stock returns. Engle (1982) introduces the ARCH model and Bollerslev (1986)
generalizes the ARCHmodel to the GARCHmodel. While ARCH and GARCH successfully capture
time varying volatility and volatility clustering, Diebold (1986) and Lamoureux and Lastrapes
(1990) nd that the high persistence of the conditional variance might reect the presence of
structural breaks, which are not captured by ARCH models. Based on the work of Hamilton
(1989) on switching regimes, Hamilton and Susmel (1994) propose the Markov-Switching ARCH
model, incorporating Markov-switching and ARCH models. Markov-switching models have been
extensively used in the applied econometric literature since the inuential work of Hamilton (1989).
See also Turner, Startz and Nelson (1989), and Schaller and Norden (1997).
A Markov-switching model extends time-series regression models by adding a discrete hidden
state variable which a¤ects the parameters of the regression models. The statistical properties
and identication of the states are not explicitly imposed, but rather are determined endogenously.
Hamilton and Susmel (1994) use the Markov-switching setting to control the structural changes
and capture the time-series properties of dramatic economic events such as economic recessions and
changes in government policies. Since we t Markov-switching ARCH to daily stock market returns,
we are able to identify continuous time variations in volatilities and test whether the reduction of
volatility is gradual or abrupt.
A generalization to Markov-switching GARCHmodels was complicated by the fact that GARCH
allows conditional variance to depend on its own past values and this path dependence of states
makes the maximum likelihood estimate infeasible. Existing methods of combining Makov-switching
and GARCH e¤ect are unsatisfactory since they su¤er from severe estimation di¢ culties. Gray
(1996) proposes a Markov-switching GARCH model which removes the path dependence by ag-
gregating the past conditional variance. However, doing so destroys the AR representation for
error terms and the model lacks analytical tractability. See also Dueker (1997), Hass, Mittnik and
Paolella (2004).
3.1 Model Specication
Since our purpose is to identify possible states and regime shifts in the level of volatility rather than
forecast, we employ Markov-switching ARCH model suggested by Hamilton and Susmel (1994).
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Denoting the rate of return for the market index as yt, we estimate the following model:
yt = 0 + 1yt 1 + :::+ pyt p + "t (5)
ut =
p
htvt; vt  i:i:d: Student t or Gaussian (6)
"t =
p
gstut (7)
ht = a0 + a1u
2
t 1 + :::+ aqu
2
t q (8)
Here, st is an unobservable state variable with possible outcomes of 1; 2; :::; k, and is assumed
to follow a rst-order Markov chain process with transition probability pij :
pij = p(st = jjst 1 = i; st 2 = k; ::; yt 1; :::) = p(st = jjst 1 = i) (9)
Also dene the transition probability matrix:
p =
26666664
p11 p21 ::: pk1
p12 p22 pk2
p1k p2k ::: pkk
37777775 (10)
The row j, column i element of P denotes the probability of going from regime i to regime j.
Each column of P sums to unity. The variable s, is regarded as the regimethat the process is in
at date t, hence s governs that parameters of the conditional distribution of y.
As in Hamilton and Susmel (1994), Eqs. (5) to (9) are known as the SWARCH(k; q) model:
the k state, q th order Markov-switching ARCH models. ut follows a standard ARCH(q) process,
and Eq. (7) shows that when st= 1, "t is equal to ut multiplied by a constant
p
g1, multiplied by
p
g2 when st = 2, and so on. To model changes in regime as changes in the scale of the process, g1
is normalized to be unity, whereas gi > 1; i = 2; 3; :::; k; for the other regimes. Error term vt follows
Gaussian distribution or Student t distribution with a degree of freedom of v, which is regarded as
an unknown parameter in the models.
We set the order of auto-regression of yt to be unity and the number of orders in ARCH to be
two. Then we estimated models with k = 2 to 3 states, with Normal and Student t innovations.
The data used in this analysis is the daily return series of the value-weighted portfolio of NYSE
stocks obtained from CRSP. The sample period is from Janaury 2, 1932 to December 31, 1936.
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It includes 1490 observations. We use the optimization program OPTIMUM from the GAUSS
programming language to minimize the negative log-likelihood numerically.
3.2 Empirical results
Table A5 reports the model selection statistics for each of the model specications. Consistent
with the ndings of Hamilton and Susmel (1994), specications under the Student t distribution
outperforms Gaussian distribution according to the Akaikes and Schwarzs criterion. Moreover,
the three-volatility-regime volatility setting outperforms the two-volatility-regime setting. Based on
both Akaikes and Schwarzs criterion, SWARCH(3,2) is the best model among any we examined.
The estimated Student SWARCH(3,2) equation is as below, with standard errors in parentheses:
yt = 0:11
(0:03)
+ 0:02
(0:02)
yt 1 + "t
ut =
p
htvt; vt  i:i:d: Student t and 5:75
(0:88)
d.f.,
"t =
p
gstut
ht = 0:75
(0:07)
+ 0:02
(0:02)
u2t 1 + 0:07
(0:03)
u2t 2
g1 = 1; g2 = 2:67
(0:36)
; g3 = 9:21
(1:09)
p =
26664
1 0:0030 0
0 0:9932 0:0045
0 0:0038 0:9955
37775
When we initially estimated the SWARCH(3,2) model, we only imposed 1 > pij > 0 and
kP
j=1
pij = 1 constraints on the transition probabilities. Several elements of the switching probability
matrix are very close to zero. Specically, p12 = 3:38 10 8, p13 = 7:45 10 4; p31 = 3:65 10 11.
Therefore we set the above three probabilities to be 0 and take these three parameters as known
constants for the purpose of calculating the second derivatives of the log-likelihood and obtain the
standard error.
The top panel of Fig. A1 plots the stock return series yt, while the other three panels plot the
smoothed probabilities Prob(st = ijy)8. The high-volatility state describes the period from January
1932 through October 1933, with the medium-volatility state characterizing from November 1933
till October 1934. The low-volatility state dominates 1935 and 1936. The variance in the medium-
volatility state (st = 2) is more than two times that in the low-volatility state (st = 1), while that
8The smoothed probabilities in Figure A1 are under the constraints of p12 = p13 = p31 = 0. Actually, the smoothed
probabilities of the unconstrained Student t SWARCH(3,2) model displays the similar pattern as in Figure A1.
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in the high-volatility state (st = 3) is more than nine times that in the low-volatility state.
Note that our maximum likelihood estimate is that the low-volatility state is never preceded by
the high-volatility state (p31 = 0). Moreover, the low-volatility state is never followed by both the
medium-volatility state and high-volatility state ( p12 = p13 = 0), which means state 1 is actually
an absorbing state (p11 = 1). During the time period of 1932 to 1936, once the process enters
the low-volatility state, there is no possibility of ever returning to the medium-volatility state and
high-volatility state9.
Overall, the coincidence between the identied dates of medium and low volatility regimes and
the dates of the enacting SEC regulation further conrms that nancial regulation reduces stock
market volatility.
4 Robustness checks
To further test the robustness of structural break results, based on realized volatility measure, we
employ a completely di¤erent methodology developed by Bai and Perron (1998) to test for multiple
structural breaks in the mean levels of the stock volatility. In this approach, the number of break
points and their location are also treated as unknown. By using the Bai and Perron algorithm we
identied the breakpoints in the time series of stock market volatility. The volatility time series is
constructed as in eq. (2)
The statistically identied dates of the breaks are amazingly consistent with the commencement
of the Acts with a fairly high precision! In short run, the break dates are estimated at 10/1933 and
10/1934 with 90% condence interval [08/1933,01/1934] and [08/1934,12/1934] respectively. Two
breakpoints break the time series of stock market volatility into three regimes: mean volatility fell
substantially from regime 1 (01/1932-10/1933) to regime 2 (11/193310/1934), and then fell further
during regime 3 (11/1934-12/1936). In long run, the estimated break date is 08/1934 with 90%
condence interval [06/1927,10/1940]. Mean volatility fell substantially from regime 1 (01/1890-
07/1934) to regime 2 (08/193412/1970). Figure 4 and 5 provide graphical depictions of the means
of di¤erent regimes identied by the BP procedure for the stock market volatility series in short
9Hamilton and Susmel (1994) also nd that the two di¤erent probabilities in the transition probability matrix
are zero, specically, the probability of the medium-volatility state to the low-volatility state, and the probability of
low-volatility state to the high-volatility state.
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and long run respectively. To examine the robustness of the results, we also conduct the structural
break test results for di¤erent sample periods. Comparing the dates when the Acts became e¤ective
with the condence intervals of the empirically estimated break dates, we nd that in short run the
rst break point corresponds with the enactment of Securities Act in May 1933, and the second
break point corresponds with the enactment of Exchange Act in June 1934. In long run, both dates
of the enactment of two Acts fall inside the condence interval for the empirical identied break
point. In summary, the coincidencebetween the identied structural break points and the date of
enacting SEC regulation further conrms that nancial regulation reduces stock market volatility.
The details of the tests are in the appendix.
19321936 is a period of signicant change in the overall US economic and regulatory envi-
ronment. These changes may confound the impact of SEC regulation on stock market volatility.
Therefore, we also examine the robustness of our results with respect to the e¤ects of other laws
passed in 1933 and 1934, the relationship with international markets (in particular the comparison
of UK and US markets), index compositions, trading volume and debt to equity ratio.
Other laws
There are many other New Deal Acts enacted during that time of period, such as Banking Act
of 1933 (June 1933)10, Emergency Banking Relief Act (March 1933), National Industrial Recovery
Act (June 1933), Gold Repeal Joint Resolution (June 1933), Gold Reserve Act (Januray 1934),
Agricultural Adjustment Act (May 1933). However, it is unlikely that these laws have signicant
impacts on stock markets since none of these laws are not directly related with stock markets,
International stock markets
If other major stock markets not subject to the 1933 and 34 Acts experienced the same reduction
of volatility during the same period of time, then the reduction of US market volatility around
1934 is unlikely due to the enforcement of two Acts. We focus on the comparison of United States
and United Kindom because they are two largest markets in the world and share some similar
structures but with di¤erent regulatory environments. We estimate SWARCH(2,2) model using
monthly return of Financial Times index. The gure 4 plots the UK stock return series, while
the other two panels plot the smoothed probabilities Prob(st = ijy). As we can see from the
gure, during 1932 the high volatility state gradually transforms to the low volatility state, which
means that the decline of volatility in UK market actually occurs before the introduction of SEC
10Passage dates are in parentheses.
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regulation. In summary, UK market does not experience the same reduction in volatility as US
market in 1933 and 1934. The concidence between the dates of US stock market volatility reduction
and the dates of SEC regulation can not be simply explained as volatility coming back to normal
level or a world wide volatility declining.
Index compositions
One concern is the change of NYSE index composition during period 1932 to 1936 may a¤ect
market volatility. Table A7 reports the composition of the NYSE index in January 1932 and
December 1936 respectively. As we can see from the table, the biggest change in the composition
of index is that the number of manufacturing stocks increases from 174 to 185. The percentage
change is 1.24%.
The number of stocks included in the index may also a¤ect the volatility of the index. When
including more stocks which have low correlations with existing stocks, we will expect the volatility
of the index to decrease. We plot time series of the number of stocks over time in Fig. 6. In
long run, 1926 to 1970, the number of stocks has been increasing gradually and there is no abrupt
increase. In short run, from 1932 to 1936, the number of stocks actually declines rst until 1934.
It is only after 1935 that the number of stocks starts to increase again.
Therefore, we conclude that there is no major changes in the NYSE index composition during
1932 to 1936 and the reduction of market volatility around 1934 is unlikely caused by the change
of index composition.
Trading volume and volatility
Low volatility of stock returns may be caused as consequence of low trading volume and trad-
ing activities. Many studies document that there is a positive relationship between volume and
volatility, which can be explained by "information ow" hypothesis, introduced by Clark (1973).
See also Andersen (1996), Bollerslev and Jubinski (1999).
In our main empirical analysis, we already include trading volume in our regression as a control
variable and we do not nd evidence that the reduction of market volatility around 1934 is directly
related to the changes of trading volume. To further examine whether there is structural break in
the level of trading volume which may cause the reduction of volatility around 1934, we apply Bai
and Perron test to the time series of trading volume with only a constant as regressor. We do not
nd any break point. Table A8 reports the statistics.
We plot the time series of volume and volatility during the period of 1932 to 1936 in Fig. 7.
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Debt-to-equity ratio and volatility
As the price of a stock falls, its debt-to-equity ratio increases. This means rms have higher
bankruptcy risk and hence higher return volatility. We plot the time series of market price level
from 1932 to 1936 in Fig 8. As we can seen from the gure, the market price increases gradually
over the period, leading to the decrease of debt-to-equity ratio. We apply Bai and Perron test to
the time series of price index and we do not nd any break point in the price level. We conclude
that the dramatic reduction of market volatility around 1934 is unlikely caused by the change of
debt-to-equity ratio.
In general, these are strong evidence supporting that the reduction of US stock market volatility
around 1934 is uniquely attribute to the introduction of SEC regulation.
5 Concluding remarks
The research on the e¤ectiveness of the 1933/34 Acts and the SEC is a general research subject that
its signicance is beyond nancial regulation. In his famous criticism of the SEC, Stigler (1964)
stated that It is doubtful whether any other type of public regulation of economic activity has
been so widely admired as the regulation of the securities markets by the Securities and Exchange
Commission. In another inuential paper criticizing the 1934 Act and the SEC, Benston (1973)
claimed that The Securities Exchange Act of 1934 was one of the earliest and, some believe, one of
the most successful laws enacted by the New Deal.(Benston, 1973). In general, Stigler (1971) and
Peltzman (1976) argued that regulation is actually a benet bought by lobbying groups to improve
their economic status. Given the concentration of regulatory benets and di¤usion of regulatory
costs the power of lobbying groups as rent-seekers is further enhanced. Therefore, debates on the
e¤ectiveness of the SEC is vital for our understanding of regulation in general.
In the previous sections, we present key results of our empirical ndings that stock market
volatility is substantially lower during post-regulation period than pre-regulation period even when
controlling for the Great Depression and other macroeconomic variables. We also identify some
break points both during short run and long run. One major break point of mid 1934 coincides
with the date of the passage of Securities Act which is consistent with our hypothesis that the
introduction of SEC regulation e¤ectively a¤ect stock market volatility.
Our results are consistent with ndings of Djankov et al. (2006), Greenstone et al. (2006) and
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La Porta et al. (2006). They are also consistent with the arguments of Xu and Pistor (2006) that
the mandatory disclosure law and SEC regulation may improve investor information. Prior to SEC
regulation, investors formed their expectations of future returns by relying on information obtained
directly from a number of private market sources such as brokers and underwriters. Allegedly,
according to the lawmakers, the information provided by these private sources is usually inadequate,
sometimes misleading or even fraudulent. The 1934 Exchange Act vested SEC with the power
to monitor the market and ensure compliance with the law. The core provision of the 1933 and
1934 Acts is that all issuers must disclose relevant information to Investors and to Regulator before
proceeding with issuing shares to the public. It established a mandatory disclosure and registration
system for all securities that were issued to the public. It dramatically increases the availability of
quality information regarding future issue performance. If such e¤ects could reduce the riskiness of
the purchase, then information e¤ects of securities regulation should be reected in the reduction
of stock volatility.
Although, we believe, our nding of positive impacts of the 1933/34 Acts in reducing market
volatility is the rst in the literature, there are reports on reduction of idiosyncratic stock volatility
after the implementation of mandatory disclosure law. However, these ndings have been inter-
preted di¤erently by their discovers. Stigler (1964) was the rst who nds that the variance of the
post-SEC new issue returns fell by approximately half. But he interpretes the decline in volatility
as driving away of high-risk issuers from the public market due to the enforcement of the Securities
Act of 1933. That is, this was construed as a side impactwhich has to be consistent with his
major ndingsthat the Act was at best ine¤ective in improving the market. In a debate on this
issue, Friend and Herman (1964) interpret the nding of volatility reduction as important evidence
of a benecial e¤ect of mandatory disclosure. They argue that full disclosure, by providing investors
with more accurate information on the intrinsic values of new issues, can reduce not only the un-
certainty on the typical investors demand prices for new issues but also the scale of fraudulent
and manipulative practice in the market. Along a similar line of thoughts as Friend and Herman,
Seligman (1983) argues that a decline in price variance discovered by Stigler (1964) would imply
that investors were receiving material information in the post-SEC (1949-1955) period that they
had not received in the pre-SEC (1923-1928) period.
Using a market- and risk-adjusted approach derived from the Capital Asset Pricing Model,
Jarrell (1981) has similar ndings that post-SEC idiosyncratic volatility was substantially reduced
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than that of pre-SEC. Moreover, Jarrell studies corporate bond default rates. He nds that default
risks declined after the SEC began enforcement of its compulsory disclosure requirements. However,
similar to Stigler, Jarrell argues that lowering the risk for new issues by the SEC is a bad news for
investors since this was the result of implementing the mandatory disclosure system which tended
to exclude risky or new rms.
Simon (1989) examines the dispersion of abnormal returns of IPOs from the pre-SEC period
(1926-1933) and that of the post-SEC period (1934-1939). She nds a substantial reduction in the
variance of stock price residuals in the post-SEC period. That is, dispersion of abnormal returns
were signicantly lower after the establishment of the SEC than before and for all issues (including
IPO and seasoned issuances) and in both NYSE and regional markets. She interpretes this as a
reduction of investorsforecast errors after the establishment of the SEC.
Even agreed with interpretations of Friend-Herman-Selilgman on Stigler-Jarrell-Simon ndings
that the idiosyncratic volatility has been reduced in Post-SEC period, one may still wonder that
by diversifying investment portfolios the welfare impact of reducing idiosyncratic volatility may be
very limited. However, the impact will be much more signicant if there is a systematic reduction
of market volatility.
Our nding of the reduction of stock market volatility during the post-SEC period is also
related to equity premium literature. The equity premium is the expected excess return on a
market portfolio over the risk-free interest rate. The reduction in stock market volatility should
correspond to a reduction in the equity premium since we would expect investors demand lower
expected return when the risk is reduced. This somehow contradicts Stiglers nding (1964) of no
signicant di¤erence in stock returns before and after the implementation of the Acts. This could
be due to the methodology Stigler employed to measuer the returns.
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Appendix:
Structural break in the time series of stock market volatility
To further test the hypothesis that the mean level of volatility is reduced since nancial regula-
tion is introduced, we employ a structural break test. The classical Chow (1960) test is one of the
earliest techniques that test for structural breaks in a linear regression model. It is popular in the
case where the date of the event causing the break is widely accepted. One just needs to split the
sample into two subperiods, estimate the parameters for each subperiod, and then test the equality
of the two sets of parameters using a classic F statistics. However, Chow test is hard to apply
when the break date is not known precisely. Thus, we adopt Bai and Perron (1998) (abbreviated
as BP hereafter) test approach for multi-structural breaks. The BP methodology explicitly treats
the number of break points and their location as unknown, endogenous to the data.
We test for multiple structural breaks in the mean levels of the stock volatility both for short
run (1932-1936) and for long run (1890-1970). Following BP, we regress the stock market volatility
on a constant and control variables. We assume the parameter vector for control variables is not
subject to shifts and is estimated using the entire sample, and only test for structural breaks in the
constant.
Before we present a more formal discussion of the BP model, we provide a general outline for
the BP method. First, an e¢ cient algorithm developed by BP searches all possible sets of breaks
and determines the set that produces the maximum goodness-of-t (R2). The statistical tests then
determine whether the improved t produced by allowing an additional break is su¢ ciently large
given what would be expected by chance (due to the error process), according to asymptotic dis-
tributions. Starting with a null of no breaks, sequential tests of k vs. k+1 breaks allow one to
determine the appropriate number of breaks in a data series. Bai and Perron determine experi-
mentally critical values for tests of various size and employ a trimmingparameter , expressed
as a percentage of the number of observations, which constrains the minimum distance between
consecutive breaks. All methods discussed are implemented in a GAUSS program developed by
Bai and Perron.
1) Model and the estimators
In this sub-section, we briey review the methodology of Bai and Perron (1998, 2003) for
estimation and inference in a simple multiple mean break model that is utilized in our empirical
analysis. We consider the simple structural change in mean model, because structural breaks in
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the mean level of stock market volatility can be interpreted as the direct e¤ect of SEC regulation.
We consider a partial structural change regression model with m breaks (m+ 1 regimes),
lnt = j + x
0
t + ut; t = Tj 1 + 1; ::; Tj for j = 1; :::;m+ 1; (A1)
where t is realized stock volatility in month t as computed in equation (1) and j (j = 1; :::;m+1)
is the mean level of stock volatility in regime j. xt is a vector of control variables including the
lagged dependent variable and the logarithms of the predicted standard deviations of PPI ination,
of money base growth, and of industrial production.  is the corresponding vector of coe¢ cients.
ut is the disturbance at time t. The m-partition (T1; :::; Tm) represents the breakpoints for the
di¤erent regimes (in our case of 1890 to 1970 data, T0 = 0 corresponding to the start date: January
1890, and Tm+1 = T corresponding to the end date: December 1970). This is a partial structural
change model since the parameter vector  is not subject to shifts and is estimated using the entire
sample. Consider estimating equation (A1) using least squares. For each m-partition (T1, . . . ,
Tm), the least squares estimates of j are generated by minimizing the sum of squared residuals,
ST (T1; :::; Tm) =
m+1X
i=1
TiX
i=Ti 1+1
(lnt   j   x0t)2 (A2)
Let the regression coe¢ cient estimates based on a given m-partition (T1; :::; Tm) be denoted by
^
(fT1; :::; Tmg), where
^
 = (1; :::m+1; ). Substituting these into equation (A2), the estimated
breakpoints are given by
(
^
T1; :::;
^
Tm) = arg min
T1;:::Tm
ST (T1; :::; Tm) (A3)
The breakpoint estimators correspond to the global minimum of the sum of squared residuals
objective function. Once we obtain the breakpoint estimates, we can calculate the corresponding
least squares regression parameter estimates as
^
 =
^
(f
^
T1; :::;
^
Tmg).
2) Estimating the number of breaks
We estimate the number of breaks through a sequential procedure which consists of locating
the breaks one at a time, conditional on the breaks that have already been located. Specically,
we start from locating the rst break and test for its signicance against the null hypothesis of no
break. If the null hypothesis is rejected, we then look for the second break conditional on the rst
break being the one already found, and test for the existence of that second break against the null
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of one single break, and so on. In the estimation process we apply the following three statistics
developed by BP.
The rst is a supF statistic which tests no structural break, m = 0, versus the alternative
hypothesis that there are m = b breaks. This statistic is dened as
SupFT (b) = FT (
^
1; :::;
^
b) (A4)
where
^
1; :::;
^
bminimize the global sum of squared residuals, ST (T1; :::; Tb) and
FT (1; :::; b) =
1
T
(
T   (b+ 1)q   p
2b
)
^

0
R0[R
^
V (

)R0] 1R
^
 : (A5)
Where,  = (1; :::m+1; ) is the vector of regression coe¢ cient estimates,
^
V (

) is an estimate of
the variance-covariance matrix for

; and R is dened such that (R)0 = (1   2; :::; b   b+1).
The second is the BP Double Maximum statistics, which test the null hypothesis of no struc-
tural breaks against the alternative hypothesis of an unknown number of breaks. The statistics
are dened as UDmax = max
1mM
SupFT (m) and WDmax, which applies di¤erent weights to the
individual Sup FT (m) statistics so that the marginal p values are equal across values of m.
The last one is the SupFT (l + 1jl) statistic, which tests the null hypothesis of l breaks against
the alternative hypothesis of l + 1 breaks. With this statistic, the number of breaks is estimated
as follows. It begins with the global minimized sum of squared residuals for a model with a small
number l of breaks. Each of the intervals dened by the l breaks is then analyzed for an additional
structural break. From all of the intervals, the partition allowing for an additional break that results
in the largest reduction in the sum of squared residuals is treated as the model with l + 1 breaks.
The SupFT (l + 1jl) statistic is used to test whether the additional break leads to a signicant
reduction in the sum of squared residuals.
We use the following strategy in identifying the number of breaks. First, we examine the
double maximum statistics (UDmax and WDmax) to determine whether any structural breaks
are present. If the double maximum statistics are signicant, we examine the SupFT (l + 1jl)
statistics to determine the number of breaks by choosing the SupFT (l + 1jl) statistic that rejects
for the largest value of l. In the process we follow Bai and Perron (2004) recommendation to use
a trimming parameter  = 0:1511.
11We implement the Bai and Perron (1998, 2003a, b) method using the GAUSS program available from Pierre
Perrons homepage (http://econ.bu.edu/perron/).
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3) Structural change results
We conduct the structural break test both in short run and long run. In short run, 1932-1936,
the control variables include the lagged volatility and the logarithms of the predicted standard
deviations of PPI ination, of money base growth, and of industrial production.
BP statistics for structural change in the mean value of the stock market volatility series be-
tween January 1932 (01/1932) and December 1936 (12/1936) are reported in Panel A of Table
A5. Both double maximum statistics (UDmax and WDmax) are signicant at conventional sig-
nicance levels, which suggests existence of structural changes in the mean level of the volatil-
ity over this period of time. In addition, SupF (2j1) statistics is signicant at the 1% level,
whereas the SupF (3j2); SupF (4j3) and SupF (5j4) statistics are all insignicant. This indicates
that there are two structural breaks (three regimes) for the volatility series. The break dates are
estimated at 10/1933 and 10/1934 respectively. And 90% condence interval for the two breaks are
[[08/1933,01/1934]] and [08/1934,12/1934] respectively. To summarize, these numbers consistently
show that mean volatility fell substantially from regime 1 (01/1932-10/1933) to regime 2 (11/1933
10/1934) after the enacting of the 1933 Act in July 1933; and then fell further during regime 3
(11/1934-12/1936) since the 1934 Act was enforced in June 1934. Figure 4 provides graphical
depictions of the means of the three regimes identied by the BP procedure for the stock market
volatility series.
To investigate long run impacts of the Acts on market volatility, in order to control for Great
Depression e¤ect, we rst regress stock market volatility on a constant and dummy variable for
Great Depression period (1929-1939) for the time series between 1890 and 1970. Then we apply
the BP procedure to the residual from the regression as stock market volatility adjusted for Great
Depression e¤ect.
Panel B of Table A5 reports the structural break test results for volatility series adjusted
for Great Depression e¤ect in long run (1890-1970). Both double maximum statistics (UDmax
and WDmax) are signicant at conventional signicance levels; however, SupF (2j1), SupF (3j2)
and SupF (4j3) are all insignicant. This suggests that there is only one structural break for
the volatility series between 1890 and 1970. To summarize, we nd that mean volatility of the
market fell substantially from regime 1 (01/1890-07/1934) to regime 2 (08/193412/1970) after
the enforcement of the two Acts in July 1933 and June 1934 respectively. Figure 5 plots the two
regimes identied by structural break test.
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To examine the robustness of the results, we also report the structural break test results for
di¤erent sample periods in Table A6. As can be seen by comparing the dates when the Acts
became e¤ective with the condence intervals for the empirically estimated break dates in Table
A6, in short run the rst break point corresponds with the enactment of Securities Act in May 1933,
and the second break point corresponds with the enactment of Exchange Act in June 1934. In long
run, both dates of the enactment of two Acts fall inside the condence interval for the empirical
identied break point. In summary, based on the statistically identied number of volatility regimes
and break dates, the results of Markov Switching models are highly consistent with the results of
our structural break tests. Without imposing any structure related to regulatory changes, the
structural break results conrms that structural breaks occurred after the enactment of the Acts.
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Table 1
Summary Statistics for Monthly Estimates of the Standard Deviations of Stock
Returns, Growth Rates of the Producer Price Index, the Monetary Base, and
Industrial Production, 1890-1970
This table reports means, standard deviations, skewness, kurtosis, and autocorrelations at lags
1, 2 of the monthly standard deviation estimates over di¤erent sample periods.
Volatility Series Sample Period Mean Std.Dev. Skewness Kurtosis r1 r2
Stock volatility 1890-1900 0.042 0.020 1.87 6.87 0.50 0.27
1890-1910 0.040 0.019 2.17 9.36 0.39 0.26
1890-1920 0.039 0.018 2.06 9.03 0.42 0.29
1890-1929 0.038 0.020 3.74 27.55 0.48 0.28
1890-1930 0.039 0.021 3.44 24.21 0.49 0.29
1890-1933 0.044 0.029 2.66 11.88 0.69 0.56
1934-1940 0.055 0.027 1.44 5.27 0.52 0.23
1934-1950 0.042 0.023 1.99 7.94 0.59 0.40
1934-1960 0.036 0.021 2.31 10.11 0.63 0.47
1934-1970 0.033 0.020 2.35 10.63 0.63 0.47
PPI ination rates 1891-1970 0.008 0.009 3.14 17.65 0.35 0.28
Monetary base growth rates 1909-1970 0.006 0.007 2.94 15.88 0.40 0.26
Industrial production growth rates 1890-1970 0.019 0.019 2.10 9.65 0.35 0.22
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Table 2
Stock market volatility and the SEC regulation, macroeconomic fundamentals in
short run
This table reports estimates of equation in short run: lnst = + 1R1t + 2R2t + 1 ln jptj+
2 ln j"mtj + 3 ln jitj + 4V olmt + 5 lnst 1 + 6 lnst 2 + ut :(1), where the dummy variable
R1t corresponding to the enforcement of the 1933 Act, R1t equals to zero before July, 1933, one
otherwise. R2t corresponding to the enforcement of the 1934 Act, equal to zero before June, 1934,
one otherwise. The control variables include the logarithms of the predicted standard deviations
of PPI ination , of money base growth , and of industrial production (IP). V olmt is the growth
rate of trading volume from month t-1 to month t. The t-statistics in parentheses use Newey-west
heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation consistent standard errors.
Macroeconomic variables
Sample period 1 2 IP PPI Base V olm st 1 st 2 R2
1932-1935  0:312
( 3:81)
 0:238
( 1:79)
0:036
(1:26)
 0:018
( 0:88)
 0:015
( 0:44)
0:010
(0:16)
0:416
(:3:55)
0:013
(0:08)
0:781
1932-1936  0:311
( 3:73)
 0:281
( 2:21)
0:029
(1:25)
 0:034
( 1:69)
 0:008
( 0:25)
 0:010
( 0:15)
0:469
(3:90)
 0:026
( 0:19)
0:806
1933-1936  0:374
( 3:13)
 0:228
( 1:85)
0:048
(1:44)
 0:039
( 1:66)
 0:005
( 0:16)
 0:14
( 1:65)
0:470
(3:65)
0:003
(0:02)
0:755
1933-1937  0:279
( 2:39)
 0:205
( 2:82)
0:050
(2:02)
 0:058
( 1:75)
0:001
(0:03)
0:024
(0:14)
0:722
(4:19)
 0:198
( 1:34)
0:683
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Table 3
Stock market volatility and the SEC regulation, macroeconomic fundamentals in
long run
This table reports estimates of equation: lnst = + rDrt + 1Rt + 2WWII + 1 ln jptj+
2 ln j"mtj+ 3 ln jitj+ 4V olmt
+5 lnst 1+6 lnst 2+ut :(2), where the dummy variable Rt equal to zero during the pre-
regulationperiod (1890-1933), one for post-regulationperiod (after 1934). The control variables
include the logarithms of the predicted standard deviations of PPI ination , of money base growth
, and of industrial production (IP). V olmt is the growth rate of trading volume from month t-1 to
month t. To control for Great Depression e¤ect, we dene dummy variable Drt equal to one from
1929-1939, zero otherwise. WWII is the dummy variable for the World War II, equal to one from
1942 to 1945, zero otherwise. The t-statistics in parentheses use Newey-west heteroskedasticity and
autocorrelation consistent standard errors
Macroeconomic variables
Sample period Regulation Recessions WWII IP PPI Base V olm st 1 st 2 R2
1909-1960  0:055
( 1:75)
0:311
(6:51)
 0:021
( 0:52)
0:023
(2:16)
0:019
(1:60)
0:016
(1:36)
0:177
(4:35)
0:457
(9:41)
0:112
(2:27)
0:595
1909-1970  0:065
( 2:16)
0:301
(6:81)
 0:007
( 0:17)
0:020
(2:05)
0:021
(1:84)
0:020
(1:88)
0:181
(4:41)
0:478
(11:19)
0:115
(2:59)
0:602
1890-1960  0:080
( 2:86)
0:294
(6:81)
 0:012
( 0:31)
0:019
(2:20)
0:020
(1:93)
0:207
(5:89)
0:472
(11:54)
0:114
(2:84)
0:542
1890-1970  0:094
( 3:42)
0:293
(7:22)
0:008
(0:22)
0:018
(2:22)
0:022
(2:21)
0:210
(5:95)
0:485
(13:05)
0:117
(3:14)
0:562
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Table 4
This table presents summary statistics for various specications of Markov Switching ARCH
models. The count of the number of parameters for the SWARCH-(3, 2) specications does not
include the transition probabilities pij imposed to be zero. The second column reports the maxi-
mum value of log likelihood function. The third and fourth column reports the AIC and Schwarz
statistics. The last column reports the degree of freedom. The standard error for this parameter is
in parentheses.
Model No. of Parameters. Loglikelihood AIC Schwarz Degrees of Freedom
Gaussian SWARCH(2,2) 8 -2694.4 -2702.4 -2763.1 -
Student t SWARCH(2,2) 9 -2649.4 -2658.4 -2682.3 4:58
(0:59)
Gaussian SWARCH(3,2) 10 -2660.9 -2670.9 -2697.4 -
Student t SWARCH(3,2) 11 -2628.2 -2639.2 -2668.4 5:75
(0:88)
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Table A1
This table presents additional regression results for short run. It reports estimates of equation
in short run: lnst = e + 1R1t + 2R2t + 1 ln jptj+ 2 ln j"mtj+ 3 ln jitj+ 4 lnst 1 + ut (1),
where the dummy variable R1t corresponding to the enforcement of the 1933 Act, R1t equals to zero
before July, 1933, one otherwise. R2t corresponding to the enforcement of the 1934 Act, equal to
zero before June, 1934, one otherwise. The control variables include the logarithms of the predicted
standard deviations of PPI ination , of money base growth , and of industrial production (IP).
The t-statistics in parentheses use Newey-west heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation consistent
standard errors.
Macroeconomic variables
Sample period 1 2 IP PPI Base lagged vol R2
1931-1936  0:204
( 2:46)
 0:235
( 2:54)
0:028
(1:13)
 0:025
( 1:02)
0:005
(0:17)
0:525
(4:92)
0.70
1931-1937  0:196
( 2:76)
 0:152
( 1:84)
0:040
(1:64)
 0:050
( 1:51)
0:007
(0:25)
0:599
(6:75)
0.66
1932-1937  0:263
( 3:87)
 0:154
( 1:79)
0:041
(1:75)
 0:058
( 1:84)
0:001
(0:02)
0:591
(6:18)
0.72
1932-1938  0:259
( 4:09)
 0:113
( 1:73)
0:037
(1:67)
 0:067
( 2:34)
 0:008
( 0:31)
0:617
(8:01)
0.67
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Table A2
This table presents additional regression results for long run. It reports estimates of equation:
lnst = e + rDrt + Rt + 1 ln jptj + 2 ln j"mtj + 3 ln jitj + 4 lnst 1 + ut (2), where the
dummy variable Rt equal to zero during the pre-regulation period (1890-1933), one for post-
regulation period (after 1934). The control variables include the logarithms of the predicted
standard deviations of PPI ination , of money base growth , and of industrial production (IP). To
control for Great Depression e¤ect, we dene dummy variable Drt equal to one from 1929-1939, zero
otherwise. The t-statistics in parentheses use Newey-west heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation
consistent standard errors.
Macroeconomic variables
Sample period Regulation Recessions IP PPI Base lagged vol R2
1909-1960  0:077
( 2:36)
0:398
(7:70)
0:029
(2:48)
0:022
(1:64)
0:477
(12:33)
0.57
1909-1970  0:089
( 2:90)
0:386
(8:08)
0:027
(2:53)
0:023
(1:89)
0:509
(15:92)
0.58
1909-1980  0:061
( 2:17)
0:337
(7:35)
0:014
(1:46)
0:022
(2:13)
0:554
(17:42)
0.56
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Table A3
This table presents additional regression results for long run. It reports estimates of equation:
lnst = e+Rt+1 ln jptj+2 ln j"mtj+3 ln jitj+4 lnst 1+ut (2), where the dummy variable
Rt equal to zero during the pre-regulationperiod (1890-1933), one for post-regulationperiod
(after 1934). The control variables include the logarithms of the predicted standard deviations
of PPI ination , of money base growth , and of industrial production (IP). We do not control
for Great Depression e¤ect. The t-statistics in parentheses use Newey-west heteroskedasticity and
autocorrelation consistent standard errors.
Macroeconomic variables
Sample period regulation IP PPI Base Lagged vol R2
1890-1960  0:048
( 1:83)
0:032
(3:14)
0:021
(1:86)
0:636
(15:59)
0.46
1890-1970  0:064
( 2:47)
0:033
(3:44)
0:026
(2:41)
0:644
(18:21)
0.49
1890-1980  0:060
( 2:53)
0:024
(2:72)
0:024
(2:55)
0:650
(19:85)
0.49
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Table A4
This table presents additional regression results for long run. It reports estimates of equation: lnst =
e+rDrt+Rt+1 ln jptj+2 ln j"mtj+3 ln jitj+4vt+5vt 1+6 lnst 1+ut , where the dummy
variable Rt equal to zero during the pre-regulationperiod (1890-1933), one for post-regulationperiod
(after 1934). The control variables include the logarithms of the predicted standard deviations of PPI ination
, of money base growth , and of industrial production (IP). We also include current and lagged trading
volume growth (v) as control variables. The t-statistics in parentheses use Newey-west heteroskedasticity
and autocorrelation consistent standard errors.
Macroeconomic variables
Sample period Regulation Recessions IP PPI Base Volume Lagged volume Lagged vol R2
1909-1960  0:067
( 2:12)
0:358
(7:12)
0:023
(2:04)
0:020
(1:59)
0:017
(1:43)
0:194
(4:89)
0:046
(1:31)
0:513
(12:74)
0.586
1909-1970  0:077
( 2:52)
0:346
(7:43)
0:021
(2:03)
0:021
(1:79)
0:021
(2:02)
0:199
(5:01)
0:043
(1:23)
0:538
(16:23)
0.593
1890-1960  0:094
( 3:38)
0:338
(7:39)
0:018
(2:03)
0:021
(1:97)
0:226
(6:63)
0:044
(1:45)
0:529
(15:04)
0.532
1890-1970  0:107
( 3:91)
0:336
(7:79)
0:018
(2:15)
0:023
(2:23)
0:229
(6:77)
0:041
(1:39)
0:546
(18:12)
0.553
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Table A5
This table reports Bai and Perron Statistics for Tests of Multiple Structural Breaks for the stock
market volatility series and the dates for the structural breaks in the mean level of the volatility
series and their 90% condence intervals for each of the break dates. Control variables include
lagged dependent variable and the logarithms of the predicted standard deviations of PPI ination,
of money base growth, and of industrial production, also the growth rate of trading volume. The
break dates correspond to the end of each regime. In Panel A, Sample period is 01/1932 to 12/1936.
In Panel B, sample period is 01/1890 to 12/1970. ***Signicant at the 1% level. **Signicant at
the 5% level.
Test
UDmax WDmax (5%) F(2j1) F(3j2) F(4j3) F(5j4)
15.07 17.20 14.59 6.83 0.91 0.54
Numbers of break selected
Sequential 2
Estimates with 2 breaks
Regime 1 Regime 2 Regime 3
end date 10/1933 10/1934
90%CI [08/1933,01/1934] [08/1934,12/1934]
Panel B
Test
UDmax WDmax (5%) F(2j1) F(3j2) F(4j3)
17.41 17.41 5.46 2.33 0.57
Numbers of break selected
Sequential 1
Estimates with 1 break
Regime 1 Regime 2
end date 07/1934
90%CI [06/1927,10/1940]
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Table A6
This table reports structural change results for di¤erent sample periods.
Sample period Regime 1 Regime 2 Regime 3
1932-1935 01/1932-10/1933 11/1933-10/1934 11/1934-12/1935
1932-1937 01/1932-10/1933 11/1933-12/1937
1933-1935 01/1933-10/1933 11/1933-8/1934 9/1934-12/1935
1933-1936 01/1933-10/1933 11/1933-10/1934 11/1934-12/1935
1933-1937 01/1933-10/1933 11/1933-12/1937
1890-1960 01/1890-07/1934 08/1934-12/1960
1890-1980 01/1890-10/1933 11/1933-07/1967 08/1967-12/1980
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Table A7
This table reports the industry composition of NYSE index in January 1932 and December
1936. Industry denition:
1 NoDur: Consumer NonDurables Food, Tobacco, Textiles, Apparel, Leather, Toys; 2 Durbl: Con-
sumer Durables  Cars, TVs, Furniture, Household Appliances; 3 Manuf: Manufacturing Machinery,
Trucks, Planes, O¤ Furn, Paper, Com Printing; 4 Enrgy: Oil, Gas, and Coal Extraction and Products;
5 Chems: Chemicals and Allied Products; 6 BusEq: Business Equipment  Computers, Software, and
Electronic Equipment; 7 Telcm: Telephone and Television Transmission; 8 Utils: Utilities; 9 Shops: Whole-
sale, Retail, and Some Services (Laundries, Repair Shops);10 Hlth: Healthcare, Medical Equipment, and
Drugs; 11 Money: Finance; 12 Other: Other Mines, Constr, BldMt, Trans, Hotels, Bus Serv, Entertain-
ment
January 1932 December 1936
Industry No. of stocks Percentage No. of stocks Percentage
1 NoDur 124 17:15 122 16:69
2 Durbl 51 7:05 52 7:11
3 Manuf 174 24:07 185 25:31
4 Enrgy 58 8:02 56 7:66
5 Chems 34 4:70 33 4:51
6 BusEq 25 3:46 27 3:69
7 Telcm 4 0:55 4 0:55
8 Utils 22 3:04 22 3:01
9 Shops 73 10:10 73 9:99
10 Hlth 6 0:83 10 1:37
11 Money 34 4:70 33 4:51
12 Other 118 16:32 114 15:60
Total number of stocks 723 731
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Table A8
To examine the presence of abrupt structural changes in the mean of the trading volume and
price index series, we apply BP test with only a constant as regressor. This table reports Bai and
Perron Statistics for Tests of Multiple Structural Breaks for the trading volume series and price
index series. Sample period is 01/1932 to 12/1936.
Panel A
Volume
Test UDmax WDmax (5%) F(2j1) F(3j2) F(4j3) F(5j4)
7.04 12:23 6.77 2.86 2.06 0.06
Numbers of break selected
Sequential 0
Panel B
Price
Test UDmax WDmax (5%) F(2j1) F(3j2) F(4j3)
20:33 24:16 29:33 0.01 7.64
Numbers of break selected
Sequential 0
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Figure 1: This gure plots the monthly estimates of standard deviation of NYSE stock market returns
over sample period 1885-1970. The estimate of the monthly standard deviation is: t =

NtP
i=1
r2it
1=2
where rit is the stock market return on day i in month t (after subtracting the sample mean for the month)
and there are Nt trading days in month t.
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Figure 2: This gure plots the logarithm of monthly estimates of standard deviation of NYSE stock market
returns over sample period 1885-1970. The estimate of the monthly standard deviation is: t =

NtP
i=1
r2it
1=2
where rit is the stock market return on day i in month t (after subtracting the sample mean for the month)
and there are Nt trading days in month t.
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Figure 3: Top panel: Daily returns on the New York Stock Exhange from January 02, 1932 to December
31, 1936. Second Panel: Smoothed probability that market was in regime 1, as calculated from the student
t SWARCH(3,2) specication. Third panel: Smoothed probability for regime 2. Fourth panel: Smoothed
probability for regime 3.
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Figure 4: Volatility and structral breaks: 1932-1936 Reported are the structural breaks in the
mean level of market volatility for January 1932 to December 1936. We nd three three distinct periods:
01/32-10/33, 11/3310/34, and 11/34-12/36.
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Figure 5: Volatility and structral breaks: 1890-1970 The test statistics suggest one structural
break (two regimes) for the volatility series: regime 1 (01/1890-07/1934) amd regime 2 (08/1934
12/1970).
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Figure 6: Top panel: monthly returns nancial times index of UK stock market from January 02, 1932 to
December 31, 1936. Second Panel: Smoothed probability that market was in regime 1, as calculated from
the student t SWARCH(2,2) specication. Third panel: Smoothed probability for regime 2.
46
1926 1931 1936 1941 1946 1951 1956 1961 1966 1970
500
600
700
800
900
1000
1100
1200
1300
1400
The number of stocks listed on the NYSE
Figure 7: The time series of the number of stocks on the New York Stock Exchange over January
1926 to December 1970
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Figure 8: The time series of monthly volatility, volume, price on the New York Stock Exchange
from January 1932 to December 1936
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